Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Salanie, Bernard. [Theorie des contrats. English]. The economics of contracts: primer / Bernard Salanie. By Bernard Salanié; Abstract: The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Article · January with 99 Reads. Cite this publication. Bernard Salanie at Columbia University. Bernard Salanie.
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The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1
Articles 1—20 Show more. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. Is your work missing from RePEc? Journal of Applied Econometrics 17 1, Journal of Political Economy 3, The economics of contracts: The goal clntracts to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own.
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Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: This “Cited by” count includes citations to the following articles in Scholar.
Title Cited by Year The economics of contracts: This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. Their combined citations are counted only for the first article. Professor of Economics, Columbia University.
The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. New citations to this author. Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: Tye C70 search for similar items in EconPapers Date: Amit Gandhi University of Pennsylvania Verified email at upenn.
Search for items with the same title. Asymmetric information in insurance: An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6.
Bernard Salanie – Google Scholar Citations
Two chapters have been completely rewritten: The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the conyracts equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. Articles Cited by Co-authors. New articles by this author. Koen Jochmans University of Cambridge Verified email at cam. The following articles are merged in Scholar.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Estimation of multi-market fix-price models: Does fertility respond to financial incentives? Estimating preferences under risk: Should more risk-averse agents exert more effort? Journal of the Econometric Society, Verified email at columbia.
Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. The Economics of Contracts: Betnard the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Marc Henry Professor of Economics Verified email at psu.